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Abstract
In 1963, Debreu and Scarf proved Edgeworth's conjecture that the core
of an exchange economy converges to the competitive equihbria as the
number of traders gets large. Unfortunately, Muench (1973), and others,
have demonstrated that this result cannot be generalized to a public goods
economy. This is due to the increasing returns to coalitional size that are
embedded in the public goods technology. The purpose of this paper is to
investigate the conditions under which core convergence can be regained
when public goods are present. We show that if all consumers become
asymptotically satiated in public good, then the core of a replica economy
converges to the set of Lindahl equilibria. Asymptotic satiation means
that the value to consumers, in terms of private goods, of receiving some
multiple of their current level of public goods consumption goes to zero as
the level goes to infinity. This assumption is trivially implied if consumers
become satiated in public good. We also show that strict nonsatiation,
which is almost the inverse of asymptotic satiation, is a sufficient condition
for core convergence. Strict nonsatiation means that consumers' marginal
rates of substitution of public for private goods is strictly bounded from
zero. We take up question of the necessity and genericity of these condi-
tions a companion paper.

1. Introduction
In 1963, Debreu and Scarf proved Edgeworth's conjecture that the core of an
exchange economy converges to the set of competitive equihbrium allocations as
the number of traders gets large. Economists have traditionally been interested in
the core because the basic hypothesis that consumers always do as well as they
can given their constraints implies that it is unlikely that allocations outside the
core will be stable in market economies. Thus, the knowledge that the competitive
allocations are the only ones that remain in the core as the economy gets large
is of great practical importance. It confirms the central position of competitive
equilibrium in economic theory, and provides a justification for the study of such
subjects as comparative statics, stability, and computation general equilibria.
It is natural to wonder whether or not this result can be extended to an econ-
omy with public goods. Here the question becomes: does the core of a public goods
economy converge to the set of Lindahl equilibrium allocations as the economy gets
large? It has long been known that it is impossible to give an affirmative answer
in general. Muench (1973), Champsaur, Roberts, and Rosenthal (1975), Milleron
(1972), and Kaneko (1976), among others, provide compelling counterexamples to
this hypothesis. The conventional wisdom seems to be that these counterexamples
are robust. The core of a public goods economy is thought either never to converge,^
or perhaps to converge only in the uninteresting knife edge case in which the increas-
ing returns to coalitional size inherent in this type of economy are precisely offset
by crowding, ^ diminishing marginal returns in production or something similar.
For example, Kaneko (1975) shows that for finite, one public good, one private good, transferable
utility economies, the core never coincides with the (unique) Lindahl equilibrium if any public good
is produced. This is a nice result; however, Kaneko's consumption sets are not bounded below in
private goods. This can lead to nonexistence of Lindahl equilibria. Strict nonsatiation does not
imply core convergence in this cases. Also, Kaneko is interested in the non-equivalence of the core
and the Lindahl equilibrium. Core convergence in a large finite economy is quite a different matter.
" For example, see Wooders (1991a).
The existing literature focuses on providing examples and counterexamples to
convergence rather than addressing the general question of when the core converges
and when it stays larger than the set of Lindahl equilibria. Here, and in related
paper we make an attempt to address the problem in general. In this paper, we
give two conditions on consumers' preferences which are independently sufficient
to guarantee that the core converges to the set of Lindahl equilibrium. These
conditions are restrictive, of course, but have very natural economic interpretations.
The theorems are proved for a replica rather than a continuum economy. This
is because it is difficult to interpret allocations in a public goods economy with a
continuum of consumers. PubHc an private goods are measured is fundamentally
different, and irreconcilable ways. Pubhc goods consumption is given as a finite
number, while each the allocation of private goods is given as a distribution function.
It is not clear what to make the fact that public goods consumption level for each
consumer is infinitely higher than (infinitesimal) private goods consumption level.
Even if the consumption levels of public goods happen to be infinitesimal as well
(this would mean that the public good level is unmeasurable in the model), it
is difficult to figure out exactly what sort of large finite economy allocation the
continuum allocation is supposed to reflect as a limiting case. This is because the
ratio of public to private goods consumption for each consumer may be bounded, or
may still be undefined, despite the fact that the public goods level is unmeasurable.
Distinguishing these two cases is important, and only possible in a finite economy.
The first theorem says that if all consumers become asymptotic satiated in
public goods, then the core converges. A consumer's preferences are said to exhibit
asymptotic satiation if the value to the consumer, in terms of private good, of
receiving some multiple of his current public goods consumption level goes to zero
as the level of public good goes to infinity. This does not seem to be a terribly
unreasonable assumption to make about consumers' preferences for many types of
public goods. For example, if a consumer had ten channels on his cable system,
he might be willing to pay a lot for ten more. But if he already had one hundred,
would he care that much about another hundred? Certainly, if he already had one
thousand, adding another thousand would hardly improve his welfare at all. Or
take a public park as an example. While a larger park is always better, a consumer
would probably care less and less about each successive doubling of the park's size.
Eventually, the park gets so big that the consumer can never hope to see the whole
thing in any event. Obviously, asymptotic satiation is trivially satisfied if consiuners
actually become satiated in public goods.
The second theorem says that if all consumers are strictly nonsatiated in public
goods then the core converges. A consumer's preferences are said to exhibit strict
nonsatiation if the desire for public goods is so strong that the marginal rate of
substitution of public for private goods is everywhere strictly bounded from zero.
For example, this assumption is satisfied if public and private goods are perfect
substitutes. This assumption has much less economic appeal; however, we argue
that there is some theoretical interest in this case.
This work is probably most closely related to Wooders (1991a, 1991b). She
studies transferable utility games derived from market economies. She provides
necessary and sufficient conditions on the pre-game under which the e-core of the
game derived from the market shrinks to Walrasian payoffs of the market. However,
the conditions described in these papers are only of the derived game form. No at-
tempt is made to take things a step back and discover the primitive assumptions
that would be required on underlying market economy. Also, Wooders restricts her
attention to transferable utility economies. In contrast, this paper concentrates of
developing conditions on the economy itself that are sufficient to give core conver-
gence in the general NTU case.
Wooders' theoretical framework is quite powerful. Extensions from the private
goods market game to a local public goods game seem to be fairly straightforward.
However, the generalization to a pure public good economy is somewhat problem-
atic. One reason is the notion of convergence used by Wooders. Roughly speaking,
convergence in her model means the core of the game contracts to the equilibrium
payoffs which are either stationary as the economy is replicated (as in the case of
a private goods economy) or go to some definite limit (as in a local public goods
economy). In a pure public goods economy, on the other hand, the typical case is
for the Lindahl equilibrium to move as the economy gets large, and it is optimal to
provide ever increasing levels of public goods. Only when all consumers are satiated
in public goods will the Lindahl equilibrium ever converge to a definite limit. This
is only in this case that convergence is possible in Wooders' sense. Thus, it seems
to us that this is probably not the appropriate notion of convergence for a pubhc
goods economy.
We suggest a different notion in this paper. Roughly stated, the core is said
to converge if for a sufficiently large economy, any allocation that is significantly
different^ from a Lindahl equilibrium cannot be an element of the core. In essence,
this requires that the core contracts to the moving target of the Lindahl allocations
as the economy gets large.
Another limitation to the application of Wooders' line of research to pure public
goods economies is that the requirement of bounded per capita payoffs seems to
play an important role in her theorems'* This is a fairly innocuous requirement for
private and local public goods economies. However, in a pure public good economy,
in which the public goods level may get arbitrarily large, it is quite limiting. It
"Significantly different" means that as the economy grows without bound, a nonvanishing fraction
of the consumers pay an amount that is at least a nonvanishing e different from their Lindahl taxes
for a Pareto optimal level of public goods
For example, this assumption shows up in Wooders (1983, 1991c, 1990), Scotchmer and Wooders
(1988), and Shubik and Wooders (1983).
requires that in some sense consumers eventually become satiated in public goods,
which is certainly not a trivial assumption. We show here that even when per capita
payoffs are not bounded, the core of a public goods economy may still converge.
Another paper that is related to this work is Weber and Weismeth (1992).
They prove a very nice theorem that says that core of a one public, one private
good NTU economy^ with strictly convex technology is equivalent to the cost share
equilibrium with respect to a strictly monotone cost share method. However, the
cost share equilibria represent a superset of the Lindahl- Foley equilibria. They also
consider the relationship between the core and the Lindahl- Foley equilibrium, which
is the closer to the topic of this paper. Here their results are somewhat weaker.
They don't show equivalence or convergence, but rather provide a characterization
of set of equilibria. Their proposition 4.2 essentially says that the Lindahl-Foley
equilibrium are in one to one correspondence with the core allocations that also
satisfy an additional restriction. The point of this proposition seems to be to provide
a means of identifying the elements of the core that can be supported by linear cost
share methods^ rather than to prove that the core converges the Lindahl equilibria
in any sense. In addition, strictly convex production technology is required for these
theorems to hold. Thus, in a formal sense, there is no overlap between these results
and the current paper.
In a related, paper Conley (1992), we examine the question of when the core of
a public goods economy does not converge. We show that the conditions given in the
current paper are almost, but not quite necessary for core convergence. However,
if slight changes in the model that reduce the domain of economies considered are
made, then these conditions become necessary and sufficient for core convergence.
Finally, we show that in any event these conditions generically do not hold, and so
Assumption 2.1 of their paper excludes the TU case.
Which Mas-Colell and Silvestre (1989) showed to be identical to the Lindahl-Foley equilibria.
generically the core does not converge.
2. The Model
We consider a simple replica economy, o^, with T types of consumers in-
dexed by t £ T = {1, . .
.
, T}, and R consumers of each type indexed by r E 1Z =
{1, . .
.
, i?}. Each consumer type has complete and transitive preferences >:t defined
over X = 3f?^ '^^ , a one private good, M public good consumption set where public
goods are indexed by 772 G yW = {1, . .
.
, M}. Each consumer type is endowed with
a strictly positive amount of private good tu^ G 5J+. A typical consumption bundle
in -rY will be written (x; y) where x is a level of private good, and y is a vector of
public goods. Consumers are referred to by their number and type. Thus {r,i} is
consumer number r of type t. Superscripts are used to represent consumers and
subscripts to represent types of public goods. Superscripts and subscripts will also
sometimes be used to distinguish different vectors of goods from one another, but
this will be done a way that prevents confusion.
The following assumptions are made on >zi for all i E T.
CONT. >zt is continuous.
CONV. If {x- y) >:t (x'; y'), then for all A G [0, 1], \{x,y) + (1 - A)(x'; y') tt (x'; y').
(Weak convexity)
MONO. If (x;y) > {x'-y'), then"^ (x;y) ^< (x';y'); also, if x > x', and y > y', then
(x;y) ^< (x';y').
(Monotonicity in all goods, and strict monotonicity in the private good.)
Define the K dimensional simplex A^^ as:
A^' = lpe^';^' yp, = i\. (1)
The three kinds of vector inequalities are represented by >, >, and '^.
Note that monotonicity implies that in equihbrium all prices are non-negative, and
in addition, the price of the private good is positive.
Let Y C 3^- X 3f?^ denote the production set. A typical feasible production plan
is written (-;y) where 2 is a negative number which is interpreted as the input of
private good, and j/ is a positive output vector of public goods. Define the marginal
cost correspondence for Y, MC : Y —» A^^, as follows:
MC{z;y) = {{p;q) e A^' \ {p;q){z-y) > {p;q){z'-y')y{z';y') G Y} . (2)
The production set is assumed to satisfy:
CLCC. y is a Closed Convex Cone.
NFPR. Y n 3fjJ^+^ = {0}. (No Free Production.)
BAMC. There exists (f) > such that for all m G ^M, all iz;y) E Y, and all {p;q) E
MC{z;y), qm/p < 0- (All public goods are producible with Bounded Above
Marginal Cost.)
Let G^ denote the grand coalition for the economy S^. A Lindahl equilibrium
for a coahtion S C G^ is a vector {x; y\p\ <?) G 3f^| x Ik^ x A I '^ I ^^ such that:
y{rA]£S, {p;q^^'){x^'';rj)<pu\ (A)
(x'--'; y) ^, [i- y) V (i; y) € A' s.t. (p; q^''){i- y) < pu\ [B)
( Y. (a:^''-u;');y)6y,
^ (C)
{r.oes
and
V(i;y)€r,
V
{r,t}6S
Now define the set of Lindahl allocations for a coalition S C G^ as:
L{S) = [{x;y)e^i'^ x3?f
I (3)
3 {p;q) G A ' ' s.t. (x; y; p; q) is a Lindahl equilibrium for S >
The separating price correspondence for >2t- H^ : .Y —+ A is defined as:
H\x-y)={{p-q)e^'^
I
(4)
(p; q){x\ y) < (p; q){^'\y') V {x'w') e x s.t. {x'\y') ^« (x; y)}
.
Note that the range oi H^ is A^. This means that the prices given by H' are not
the same prices faced by the consumer at a Lindahl equilibrium for a coalition S
since these prices are elements of A ' ^ I ^. However, if {x; y) is a Lindahl allocation,
then there must exist normalization factors k^'^ £ (0, 1] for each consumer that can
be used to put the prices (p; q) E H\x; y) back into A ' '^ ' ^. This normalization is
described in detail below.
An allocation (x; y) for a coalition S is said to be S-optimal if it is feasible
for 5, and there does not exist a feasible Pareto dominant allocation (i';y) for S.
Formally, {x;y) is 5-optimal if
^(x;y)6 3?i^l x5ftf s.t. I ^ [x^'' - u;'] ; y ) G F,
V{r,t}G5, {i'^';y)ht{x'^';y),
and
3{rj}eSs.t.{i'-^';y)yt{x^'';y).
It will frequently be convenient to take advantage of the fact that the well-
known Samuelson conditions must be satisfied by any 5-optimal allocation. In the
notation of this paper we say: if an allocation {x;y) for a coalition S G G^ is
5-optinial, then
V{r,t}G5, 3{p'-'';q'-'')eH{x'-'';y), 3 and 3 ^^'•', G (0, 1]
s.t. fc'--' X p'--' = p, (p; k''' xq''\..., A:^-^ X q^^^) E A I ^ I ^^
and
\{r,OGG« / {r,t}eS
Note that the normalization factor cancels out in the last line.
The offer correspondence, OC^ : 3?^ —> 3R+, is defined as follows:
OC\y) = {xe^+\ 3{p-q)e A^' s.t. (5)
(P; q){x; y) < P^' and [x; y) ht (x'; y') V (:r'; y') G X s.t. (p; q){x';ij') < pu'}
The graph of this correspondence is the offer curve for a consumer of type t. The
reader may verify that x G OC^{y) if and only if for some {p;q) G H\x;y),
{p]q){x;y) =puK^
An allocation (x;y) is in the core for the grand coalition G^ if,
]3SCG^, and (i; y) G 3f?|^ ' x 3?^^ s.t. ^ [i^'' - u;'] ; y | G F,
Also, see equation 8, below.
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and
and in addition:
3 {r,i}e5s.t. (i-'-'^y)^, (:c''';!/)-
This is just the usnal requirement that no coalition can block any core allocation.
Notice that blocking coalitions can only consume the public goods produced using
their own resources. They cannot free ride off the public goods produced by the
rest of the consumers. This follows Foley, and others. The set of core allocations
for the grand coalition G^ will be denoted by C{G'^).
In order to be assured that Lindahl equilibria exist, and are in the core, we take
advantage of Foley's (1970) method of modeling public goods as jointly produced
private goods. If it can be shown that competitive equilibria exist, and are in
the core for the associated private goods economy, then it may be concluded that
Lindahl equilibria exist and are in the core of the original public goods economy. It
is easy to verify that the six assumptions on consumers and producers given above
imply all of the assumptions used by McKenzie (1981) to show existence.^ We may
then use Milleron's (1972) theorem 4.1 to conclude that the Lindahl equilibrium is
always in the core. The exercise of explicitly carrying out the translation of this
model into a private goods economy is not performed here because it is long, and
it would essentially be a duplication of Foley's contribution.
Lenmia 1, we show a useful relationship between the core, consumers' offer
curves and the Lindahl equilibria.
Lemma 1. Let S^ satisfy CONT, CONV, MONO, CLCC, NFPR, and BAMC,
thenif{x;y) G C{G^), and for all {r , t} G G'^, x'"-' € OC\y), then{x;]/) e L{G^).
We cannot use Milleron's (1972) existence theorem directly as he assumes that the endowments
are in the interior of the consumption sets. In tiiis model, public goods levels are initially zero.
Also, Foley assumes strict monotonicity, so his theorems cannot be used either.
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Proof/
1. If for all {r,t} £ G^, x''>' G OC\y), then by the definitions of H^ and OC
3 (p'--'; q^'^) e H'{x^'';y) s.t. (p^-'; q'-''){x'''';y) < pu'
and
(:c'-''; y) ^, (a:'; y') V (x'; y') e X s.t. (p'"''; ry'-'')(x'; y') < p^'^u'.
2. Also, since core allocations are feasible by definition,
3. Finally, suppose
V{r,i} e G^, and V (p^-'; ^'••') e A^^ s.t. :
a. {p^'^;q''')eH'ix^'^-y),
b. {p''^';q'-^'){x'''-.y)<p'-''u^,
c. (x'-''; y) ^, (x'; y') V (i; y) G X, s.t. (p'"''; <?'--')(x; y) < p'^-'u;',
it is not the case that
3 (p''-'; (?'•') G i/lx'"-'; y), and 3 k''' G (0, 1] s.t.
it'-'' xp^'' =p,
and,
(p;^^^'^ x^^^...,/l-^-^xry'^-^)GAl^l^,
V(f;y)Gr,
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But this would violate the Samuelson conditions. This in turn contradicts the
hypothesis that (i; y) G C{G^) and is therefore Pareto optimal.
Lemma 1 says that if a core allocation is also on each of the consumers' offer
curves, then it is a Lindahl allocation. This suggests the notion of core convergence
used in this paper. We say the core converges to the set of Lindahl allocations if
for any e > and for all sequences of core allocations {(x^;y^)}, the proportion
of the consumers in G^ who remain off their offer curves by at least e goes to zero
as R grows without bound. In other words, the core converges if in the limit, all
consumers contribute exactly their Lindahl taxes to support an allocation that is
in the core.
More formally, define the coalition 5(e,.c;y) to be the set of consumers who
are off there offer curves by at least e at the allocation {x\ y):
S(e,a;;y)= (C)
{{r,i) G G
I
V(x',y') s.t. x' G OC\y')^
\\
{x' y'),{x''';y) \\ > e} .
Then let the function NOC : 3?+ x 3?^^ x ^'^^ -> [0,1], give the proportion of
displaced consumers in S^:
NOC{e,x\xj) = — . (7)
The core is said to converge to the set of Lindahl allocations if for any sequence of
core allocations {(x^; y^)), and for any e > 0,
lim NOC(e,x-^;y^) = 0.
R—*oo
It is essential to the lemmata in sections three and four that the correspondence
OC be well defined. The purpose of lemmata 2 through 6 is to show that under the
assumptions of CONT, CONV, and MONO, OC\y) is not empty for any y G 3?+
.
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Lemma 2. Let ^< satisfy CONT, CONV, and MONO, then for all bundles (x; y) G
X, H^{x,rj) is not empty.
Proof/
Consider the upper-contour set of (x; y) G X for yt:
U\x;y) = {{x';y') e X
\
{x';y') y, {x;y)].
By CONT, CONV, and MONO, U\x;y) ^ and is also closed and convex. Then
by the Hahn-Banach theorem, for all (x; y) G X,
3{p-q)eH'{x,y).
Lemma 3. Let >t satisfy CONT, CONV, and MONO. Then if' is an upper hemi-
continuous correspondence.
Proof/
First we show H*^ is a closed-valued correspondence. Let {{x'^\y'^)] be a con-
vergent sequence in X, let hni^_oo, l^:"; y") = (i;y), and let (p^^q^) G H^x^-^y")
for all u. Note that {p^;q^) exists by lemma 2, and since {p'^;q^) G A'^'^ for all u,
there exists a subsequence {(p" ;q'^ )} such that limj^'-^ooCp" ;<?") = (p; </) £ A^''.
It must be shown that
(p; 9)(^; y) < (p; 5)(2;'; y') V (x'; y') G A" s.t. (x'; y') >-< (x; y).
Suppose not, then
3(x';y') GXs.t. (x';y')^^(^-;y)
and
(p;^)(^;y) > (p;^7)(;c';y').
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By CONT,
3 e > s.t. {x' - e; y') ^t (^; y)
and (p; ^)(x; y) > (p; ^)(2;' - e; y').
But then by CONT, and MONO, for sufficiently large u'
,
By the definition of H\ for sufficiently large u'
,
{p^';q^'){x''';r/)<{p^';q^'){x'-e-y').
But,
' ..'
(p"
;
9" ) ^ (P; ^), and (x" ; y'' ) -> (x; y)
so
(p;fy)(x;y) < {p;q){x' -e;y'),
a contradiction.
Thus, i7' is a closed valued correspondence. But since A^^ is compact, by
Hildenbrand (1974) proposition B.2, H^ is UHC.
Lemma 4. Let ^( satisfy CONT, CONV, and MONO, then H^ is convex-valued.
Proof/
Suppose not. Then
3(x;y) eX, 3 {p-q),{p'-q')eH\x-y) and 3\e [0, 1] s.t.
A(p; 9) + (1 - A)(p'; ^') = (p'V/') ^ ^'(^; y)-
Then,
3 (x; y) G X s.t. (x; y) ^< (x; y) and (p"; </")(a:; y) > (/V; (/")(x; y),
15
which impHes,
A {{p; q) [{x- y) - (£•; y)]} + (1 - A) {{p'-q') [{x- y) - (x; y)]} > 0.
However, this is impossible since
(p; q) e H\x- y) and (p'; q') 6 i:r'(a:; y).
Now define the map /^ : [0,u;'] C 3?+ ^ 3R by:
/^(x) = {ie^\ 3{p-q)e H\x- y) and 7 = (p; g)(x - u;'; y)}. (8)
This correspondence /' gives the values of excess demand at each of the prices
supporting (x;y). More exactly, it is the differences between the possible values of
the endowment that a consumer of type t would have to have, and the value of the
one he actually has, if (x;y) were to be on his offer curve. Thus, for a particular
value of y, if G fl{^)-, then (x; y) is on the offer curve of consumer of type t}^
Lemma 5. Let ^t satisfy CONT, CONV, and MONO, then for all [u^;]/) G X,
there exists x G [0,cj'] such that G fl{^)-
Proof/
Clearly /' is UHC, convex-valued, and non-empty valued since it is the product
of correspondences with these properties. Consider the following subsets of the
domain:
D+ = {x e [0,uj']
\
3z e fy{x) and ^ > 0}
D- = {x e [0,u;']
I
3 z G fy{x) and z < 0}
10 Lemma 5 is This is similar to lemma 3.8 in Diamanlaras (1992).
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1. Note first that D' 7^ 0. Let {p;q) 6 ^'(0;y). Then
V {x'-y')
€
X s.t. {x';y') ^t (0; y), (p; 7)(0; y) < (p; ry)(:r'; y').
Then since gy < px' + qy'
,
VA G (0, 1], Xqy < Xpx' + Xqy'
.
And since Ap < p + (1 — A)(l — p),
Xqy < {p + {1 - \){l ~ p))x' + Xqy'
.
But,
M
p + (1 - A)(l _ p) + A^ 5, = p + (1 - A)(l - p) + A(l - p) =. 1.
1=1
Therefore,
(p + (l-A(l-p);Ar/)Giy^(0;y).
However,
hmp + (l - A)(l-p) = 1.
A—
But since u;' > 0, for small enough A,
(p + (l-A)(l-p))(0-u;') + Aryy <0.
Thus G Z)~, and so D" ^ 0.
2. Also note that D+ ^ 0. By MONO
V(x;y)eXand V (p; ^) G i/'(x; y), (p;f7)>0.
So
p(u;' -a;') + r/y > 0.
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Thus a;' e D+, and so D+ ^ 0.
3. Finally note that ^ /^(.t) for all x G [0,w'] imphes D+f^ D' = 0. This follows
from the fact that /^ is convex-valued which imphes that for any x £ [0,u;'], if
X G D+ and x ^ D~ , then G /^(a^)-
4. It only remains to show that Z)+ r\D~ ^ 0. Suppose not. Then since both sets
are non-empty, at most one of them can be closed. Without loss of generality,
suppose D'^ is not closed. Then
^x']
I
Vi/x'^ eD^.x' -^a:,0 < flj{x') and > /^(x).
But this contradicts that fy is UHC on [0,a;']. Therefore, there is some x G 3^+
such that G /'(x).
Lemma 6. Let tt satisfy CONT, CONY, and MONO, then for all y G 3?+ , OC\y)
is not empty.
Proof/
From lemma 5,
V(u;^y)GX, 3xG[0,u;']s.t. OG/i(x).
But then
3-(p; q) e H\x] y) s.t. (p; q){x -u';y) = 0.
Therefore, by definition of ff ' :
3 {p;q) G H\xyy) s.t. {p;q){x;y) < pu^
and
V(x';y') G X s.t. (x';y') >zt (2:; y), (p; g)(x'; y') > pa;'.
Thus X G OC"(y)
18
3. Two Convergence Theorems
We prove two separate convergence theorems in this section. The first shows
that if for all consumers, the value in terms of private good of receiving a given
multiple of their current public goods consumption level goes to zero as the level of
public goods goes to infinity, then the core converges to the set of Lindahl alloca-
tions. This assumption is called asymptotic satiation, and it is easy to see why it
drives the result.
The reason that the core of a public goods economy is typically quite large
is that the grand coalition is able to spread the costs of public goods production
more widely than any subcoalition. As a consequence, subcoalitions find it difficult
to block allocations offered by the grand coalition even when all the consumers in
the subcoalition are charged more than their Lindahl taxes. When all consumers
become asymptotically satiated in public good, this ceases to be true. In this
case, consumers do not care very much about extremely high levels of public goods
consumption. This puts a limit on the degree to which the grand coalition can
"exploit" its cost advantage. Suppose, for example, that the grand coalition tried
to give even a small proportion of the consumers a level of private good consumption
that was less than the level at a Lindahl allocation. As the economy got large, the
members of the subcoalition would find that they are sufficiently numerous that,
at lower cost, they could easily produce a bundle of public goods that is almost
as good as the one offered by the grand coalition. The subcoalition would then be
able to block the effort to give them less private good than they would get at a
Lindahl allocation. In short, asymptotic satiation removes the increasing returns
to coalitional size that are embedded in the public goods technology. As a result,
even small coalitions are able to block attempts on the part of the grand coalition
to deviate from the Lindahl allocations.
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Before giving a formal definition of asymptotic satiation, consider the notion of
compensating variation. This will be used to measure the difference in desirability
between two given bundles of public and private goods. Specifically, the compen-
sating variation is the largest amount of the private good that could be taken away
from bundle 2 while still leaving the consumer at least as well off at bundle 1 . The
compensating variation can be positive or negative. It is always well defined if the
second bundle is better than the first. Formally, for a consumer of type t:
CV\x-y;x';y') = {maxz G 3?
|
{x;xj) ^, {x' - z;y')} . (9)
Now asymptotic satiation can be defined as follows:
AS.SAT. V .r G 3^+, V (7 6 (0, 1], lim
|| y ^ ^^o CV^{x; ay; x; xj) = 0.
Examples of preferences that satisfy asymptotic satiation include those for
which consumers are eventually satiated in public good. An example of preferences
which satisfy AS.SAT, but which do not exhibit satiation in public goods can be
found in Wooders(1981):
u{x\ y) = X — e~^
.
In both of these examples, the offer curves are asymptotic to cc;' as y goes to infinity.
In other words, the Lindahl taxes go to zero as the bundle of public goods gets
large. Lemma 7 shows that this property of the offer curves is an implication of
asymptotic satiation. This means, incidentally, that Cobb-Douglas preferences do
not satisfy asymptotic satiation. It is not hard to confirm this by noticing that
the compensating variation between two bundles as described in the statement of
AS.SAT remains constant in the Cobb-Douglas case. Thus, asymptotic satiation is
weaker than satiation in public goods, but stronger than assuming that the marginal
rate of substitution goes to zero.
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Lemma 7. Let ^i satisfy CONT, CONV, and MONO, then if m addition >-i
satis£es AS.SAT,
lim OCUy) - to.
II y 11 -^
Proof/
Suppose that asymptotic satiation is satisfied but that tlie offer curve does not
converge as stated. Then
3 {y") s.t.
II
y''
II
-> oo and 3 e > s.t. y u' , 3 u > u' and 3 x'' G OC'iy")
^.t. x*^ < u;' — e.
Note that the possibihty that x" > cj' + e need not be considered since by MONO,
all prices are non-negative and so x'' < (^'- Also, by definition of OC, for all u,
and for all x" 6 OC^y")
3 (p'';^'^) G H[x^-y) s.t. r/y" =p''(u;' - x'').
But since,
it follows that
{p^-q^){\u^' + \x^-\y'^)=p'^u,
(ic+ix^iy")^, (x^y'').
Recall that AS.SAT. implies that
VxG$R+,
,
lim CV'(x;iy^x;y'^) = 0.
II y II -oo
So by MONO, for large u
(|u; + ix'^;iy''))^, (iu^ + ix^-ieiy-
But by hypothesis,
uj — e> x^
,
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and therefore,
So by MONO, for large u,
But then by transitivity,
au+\x'';h/)y,{x''-yn,
which is a contradiction.
If we are willing to place a fairly mild additional "uniform continuity" assump-
tion on the separating price correspondence, then this result can be strengthened
to prove that AS.SAT is equivalent to the offer curve converging to the endowment.
U.CONT. There exists ^ > such that for all (x;y) G X, and all {p;q) G H^{x;y), if
X < X then for some {p;q) E H\x]y), ^ < 9^.
This assumption says that Marginal Rate of Substitution (MRS) between any
pubic good type m and private good at an allocation {x; y) can go up by at most
a bounded proportion as the level of private good consumption goes down. This
may seem like an odd requirement, but in reality it is only a weakening of better
known assumptions. For example, if preferences are quasi-linear in the private good,
then ^ = 1. Alternatively if the ordinary assumption of diminishing MRS in the
private good is made, then ^ < 1. The assumption of U.CONT allows the MRS
to actually increase as private goods consumption decreases. It just places a upper
bound on the rate of increase. Thus, U.CONT is not very restrictive. It only
excludes preferences for which the MRS changes in the "wrong" direction in such
to an extreme degree that no uniform bound can be found.
9.9.
Lemma 8. Let ^i satisfy CONT, CONV, MONO, and U.CONT, then in Fiddition
)^t satisfies AS.SAT if and only if
lim OC'{y)=uj'.
y II — oo
Proof/
From lemma 7, if >^{ satisfies AS.SAT, the offer curve converges to the endow-
ment.
Now suppose that the offer curve converges, but >~t does not satisfy AS.SAT.
Consider what happens to compensating variation along the offer curve. We know
that
Vjy'^js.t.
II
y""
II
->ooand V x"^ G OC'iy'), x" -^ uK
But this implies that
V [p^-q'') e H\x'';y^), q'y' = p''{u' - x^) ^ Q.
Let a E (0,1]. Then at these supporting prices a bundle of public goods - times
as big as y^ could have been chosen in exchange for -^ private goods but was
not. Then by CONV, this puts an upper bound an the compensating variation. In
particular,
Therefore,
VcrG(0,l], L^>CV\x'^-y''-x^--y^).
a
By hypothesis x^ -^ cj'. Thus it only remains to show that the compensating
variation goes to zero for sequences of allocations {(i"u;y'')} such that f'' y^ a;'.
That is, to show the AS.SAT. holds for arbitrary consumption bundles, not just
bundles on the offer curve. So suppose that for large z/, f' < x'^''. But by
U.CONT,
3^>0, and(;5'';<?'')Gif'(x'';/)|^<^%.pu pi/
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But then
(7 crp^ ap'^
We are now ready to give the first convergence theorem.
Theorem 1. Let {S^} be any sequence of economies satisfying CONT, CONV,
MONO, CLCC, NFPR, and BAMC. Then if for all t e T, ^t satisfies AS.SAT,
then the core converges to the set of Lindahl allocations.
Proof/
Two cases are considered.
1. First suppose that y^ —> oo. It is sufficient to show that
^{(x^; y^)}, s.t. V R, {x^;y^) G C{G^) and
3 e > Oand 3 a G (0, l] s.t. W R' , 3R> R' , s.t. NOC{e,x^;y^) > a.
Let S be coahtion of consumers who are off their offer curves by at least e.
Divide S into two subcoahtions: S^ (x^; y^), consisting of the consumers
who are above their offer curves by e or more (and are therefore paying less
than their Lindahl taxes), and S^ (a:^;y^), consisting of the consumers who
are below their offer curves by e or more (and are therefore paying more than
their Lindahl taxes). Formally,
S^^x'^-y^) = {{rj} e G^
I
Vi'-'' e OC\y^),x'-^' > i^'' + e} (10)
and
Srix^'^y") = {{r,t] £ G^
I
Vi^-'
€
OC'(y^),x'-'' < 5^'' - e}. (11)
Also define the sequence of allocations {(.r^
;
y^ )} for the sequence of coali-
tions {5f~(x^;y^)} as follows: x^~ -''^ = lj' - ^e for {r,t} G 5/^" (:c^; y^),
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and y^ is the largest feasible vector of public goods when all the tax revenue
collected by S^ {x^;y^) is spent on a bundle proportional to y^.
Consider two subcases:
a. First, suppose
II
j/^
II
-. GO and V 7?', 3 ;? > R' s.t. '^ '^_ ^ ^' > ^a.
Then there exists an arbitrarily large R such that S^ {x^\y^) can block
(x^; y^) with the allocation (x^ ; y^ ). To see this note that the most that
G^ can collect in taxes is TRu"^'^^ where uj^^^ is the largest endowment
held by any consumer of any type. On the other hand, for all i?', there
exists R > R' such that the tax revenue collected by S^ (x^; y^) is at least
collects ^aTR^e. But by CLCC, F is a convex cone with zero origin, and
the tax revenue of the coalition S^ (z^;y^) is always at least a fraction,
cr, of G^'s for arbitrarily large R where
\aRT\e jae
a = ^ ^ - -^
TRwmax u;'
and so y^ > cry^ . Thus,
V {r,<} G Sr{x^:y^Ux^~''''\y^~)^i (u;' - \e:<ry^). (12)
Also by MONO, all prices are non-negative, and so
V{r,t}6G^,cu' >x^'^''
Then since agents in S^ (x^; y^) are below their offer curves by at least
V {r,0
€ S^ix^-y^W " e > x^-^''. (13)
Also by AS.SAT. for large R,
V {v,t] e G^, lim CV\x^''-'';ay^- .r^''"''; y^) = 0.
II
y^
II
—oo
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So for large R:
V {r,t] e Sr{x^;y^).{uj^ - '^e-ay^) X, (c^ - e;y^). (14)
So by (12), (13), and (14),
(x^-'^'^-y^-) tt (u;' - '^e;ay^) X, (c' - e;y^) tt (x^''^'Vy^). (15)
Therefore, 5f" {x^; y^) blocks (x^; y^) with (x^" ; y^" ) for large R
b. Now suppose
II
y^
II
^ oo and \/ R' , 3 R > R' s.t. '^ ^^_ ^ ^' > ia.
But by lemma 7,
ViGT lim OC'(y)=cj'.
Therefore, for large J?,
V{r,i}G5r(:r«;y^),:r^''~''>"'CJ
But then consumers Sj^ (x^;y^) consume more private good than they
are endowed with. This could not be a core allocation since the remaining
agents, G^ \ S^ (x^; y^), could block {x^; y^) by ejecting the consumers
in 5/^ i^^', y^) from G^ and dividing among themselves the net payment
of private goods that would have gone to these ejected consumers.
2. Finally suppose that for some sequence of core allocations (x^; y^)^
3y'
€
SR+ and R' s.t. \/ R > R'
, \\
y^
\\
< y'.
Since attention is now restricted to a compact subset of the consumption set,
and we are interested only in the limit allocations it is sufficient to restrict
attention to sequences of core allocations for which the level of public goods
converges to a limit. To save notation let y^ —> y'.
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First we show that for all but a vanishing fraction of agents, the consump-
tion of private good converges to endowment. Let Sy'ix -jy ) be the coalition
of agents who consume at least e less than tu' at the core allocation.
5f(x«;y«)^{{r,0GG«|u;'-x^''-''>.}.
Note again that we need not consider the case in which u^ < x^''"''. This would
be a situation in which some agents receive a net subsidy of private good. But
this is impossible for a core allocation by the argument given in (1. b.) above.
So to prove the claim them we must show:
I S^ 1
V e > ^cv 6 (0, 1] s.t. y R'3 R> R' and -^-^ > cv.RT
Suppose not, then we claim that S^{x^\y^) can block (x^;y^) for large R.
This is because for all R' , there exist R > R' such that the coalition S^{x^; y^)
pays at least aRTe —> oo in taxes. But by CLCC, and NFPR, this must exceed
the cost of producing any finite bundle of public goods y' . Thus for large R,
S^{x^]y^) could produce y' on its own at lower cost. This allocation clearly
blocks (x^; y^).
Now we show
y {r,t]eG^\S^{x^;y^\u' eOC\y').
Suppose not, recall that {x^]y^) is in the core for all R. Thus {x^;y^) is
Pareto optimal and satisfies the Samuelson conditions. Then
V e' > 0, 3R' s.t. \/ R> R' and V {r, t] e G^ \ 5f (x'N y^^)
3(p \q ' ' j E n [x , y ) and q ' ' < e .
Then since by lemma 3, if' is UHC,
(1;0)G lim if'(.r«''-'Vy^).
rt—'OO
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But we already know that
Thus {u>^;y') is supported by prices (1;0) and is therefore on the offer curve.
This proves the claim.
Finally, it is clear that
hm 5(e,z^;y^) = 0.
R—oo
This is because for large for all but a vanishing fraction of agents, (x^^''-'
,
y^) -^
The second convergence theorem says that if the MRS of public for private
goods does not go to zero as the quantity of public goods goes to infinity, then core
converges. This assumption is called strict nonsatiation and it is even easier to see
why it drives the result. For coalitions of sufficiently large size, strict nonsatiation
implies that every core allocation is one in which essentially all of the private good is
used to produce a Pareto optimal quantity of public goods. This obviously coincides
with the Lindahl Equilibria.
As we noted in the introduction, strict nonsatiation is of less practical interest
than asymptotic satiation It implies that consumers have such a strong preference
for public activity that even for economies of moderate size, consumers choose
to devote all of their resources to public goods. This might reflect the tastes of
members of Utopian communities, but these preferences are clearly not shared by
the majority of consumers. We also note that it is a very strong assumption. It
could probably be weakened (eg. strict nonsatiation in a least one good per agent
type.) without changing the conclusions. However, since this condition is mainly of
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technical interest, we do not attempt to prove the most general theorem possible.
Formally, strict nonsatiation is defined as:
S.N.SAT. There exists /3 > such that for all (x; y) G .Y, for some (p; q) G H^{x\ y), and
for all m£ M, ^> li.
An example of a class of preferences that satisfy strict nonsatiation is any
preference relation in which public goods and private goods are perfect substitutes.
Remark: Notice that S.N.SAT, and CONV. imply that for all (x; y) € X such that x > 0,
for all (p; q) G H^{x\ y), and all m 6 >M, ^^ > /?. That is, the marginal rate of
substitution of each public good for the private good is bounded below by /? in
the interior of the consumption set.
Lemma 9. Let [S^] be any sequence of economies satisfying CONT, CONV,
MONO, S.N. SAT, CLCC, NFPR, and BAMC. Let {(x^;y^)} be a sequence of
allocations such that for all R, (x^;y^) E C[G^). Finally, given any e > 0, let
5f(x^;y^) = {{r,t} 6 G^ | x^'^'' > e}. Then,
V , > 0, hm \^^^iy'^\ = ^R^^R.^ yR) = 0.H-oo RT e V > y /
Proof/
Suppose not. Then -
3 {(x^; y^)} s.t. V R, (x^; y^) E C(G^), 3 6 > 0, and 3 d
€ (0, 1] s.t.
y R', 3R>R's.t.a^{x^;y^) > a.
Let
S^'{x^;y^)^{{r,j}eS^{x^;y^)\j=t}.
Then, since there is only a finite number of consumer types,
3t' eT and 3 d
€
(0. 1] s.t. V i?', 3 R> R\ s.t.
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In words, at least a x RT consumers of some type t' consume more than e of the
private good at some core allocation for an economy of arbitrarily large size.
Then since x^'""'' > 0, by S.N.SAT, and CONV (see remark above),
But since by monotonicity all prices are non-negative:
V i^', 3R>R! s.t. V (p"'^ q'^') e H'ix^''''; y^) V m G >f
E E !S ^ "^^^''-
However, by assumption BAMC,
V (.- y) G r, and V (p; g') G MC{z; y), ^ < <^.
P
So clearly, for large enough R, (i) < aRT/3. Thus, for large enough R, the Samuel-
son conditions are not satisfied at {x^;y^). This contradicts the hypothesis that
{{x^] y^)} is a sequence of core allocations for G^.
In words, it is impossible for a fixed fraction of consumers to consume a positive
quantity of the private good because, eventually, these consumers become so nu-
merous that even among themselves, the marginal benefit of spending their private
good on public goods production exceeds the cost. Thus, no such allocation could
be Pareto optimal, much less in the core.
Lemma 10. Let {S^] be any sequence of economies satisfying CONT, CONV,
MONO, S.N.SAT, CLCC, NFPR, and BAMC. Let {{x^;y^)] be such that for all
R, (x^;y^) G C(G^). Then
lim OC\y^) = 0.
R—'oo
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Proof/
By lemma 9,
Thus, by BAMC
3 m Ei M s.t. y^ —> CO.
Then suppose
V i?', 3R>R' s.t. 3 t
€
T, and 3 e > and 3 X e OC^{y^) s.t. z > e.
But since y^ -^ oo, while the maximum level of Lindahl taxes paid by an agent of
type t is bounded above by u;',
yteT,3meM s.t. V |^ | s.t. V i?, (p^-'--'; g^''-'') e iy'(x^'^-^ y^),
QmR,r,t
->0.
pft.r.t
However, by S.N.SAT, and CONV, (see remark above)
V(.r;y) e A' s.t. x > 0^ {p;q) E HUx-y), and V m G M,— > 3,
P
a contradiction. Thus for large R,
V t e T, ^e > and 3x6 OC\y^) s.t. x > e.
It only remains to show that G OC^{y^) for all t E T . But this is immediate since
by lemma 6, OC^{y^) ^ 0, and we have just shown that no other x is an element
of the offer curve for large R.
Note that the two assumptions discussed in this section have exactly opposite
implications for the behavior of the offer correspondence. Strict nonsatiation im-
plies that the offer correspondence converges to zero, while asymptotic satiation
implies that it converges to the consumer's endowment. We now show that strict
nonsatiation is a sufficient condition for core convergence.
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Theorem 2. Let {S^} be any sequence of economies satisfying CONT, CONV,
MONO, CLCC, NFPR, and BAMC. Then if for all t e T, tt satisfies S.N. SAT,
then the core converges to the set of Lindahl allocations.
Proof/
By lemma 10,
V{(a;^;y«)}s.t. V i?, (x^; y^) 6 C(G^^), Jim OC'(y^) = 0.
R—'OO
By lemma 9,
- R-oo ' RT
Then since consumers can't consume negative quantities of private goods it follows
immediately that,
Ve > lim NOC{e,x^;y^) = 0.
This theorem is of interest mainly because it illustrates the difficulty in gen-
eralizing the intuition gained from studying private goods economies to ones with
public goods. The basic idea behind existing results is that the core converges if (or
sometimes, if and only if) the returns to coalitional size are constant in the limit.
This makes the public goods economy "private like" in the limit, and causes any
derived game to be linearly additive. In contrast, theorem 2 shows the core also
converges if the returns to coalitional size are sufficiently large. We know of no
corresponding result for a private goods economy.
The reader may object that this is merely a technical artifact of our assumption
that the consumption sets are bounded from below. There are two responses to this
criticism. First, this assumption is very reasonable from an economic standpoint.
It does not make much real world sense to imagine agents consuming unboundedly
negative quantities of goods. Second, although it is true that dispensing with the
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assiunption (as in Kaneko (1975)) makes it possible to prove a theorem like "'the
core converges if and only if there are constant returns to coalitional size in the
limit", this comes at the expense of existence of Lindahl equilibria. For example,
if consumers are strictly nonsatiated in Kaneko's model, the only Pareto efficient
allocations involve consumers getting infinite utility^ ^by consuming a positive in-
finity of public goods and a negative infinity of private goods. Thus, bounding the
consumption sets is not just a technical detail.
It is also worth noting that core convergence also holds if some types of con-
sumers in the economy satisfy asymptotic satiation, and others satisfy strict nonsa-
tiation. Theorem 2 says that ''almost all" consumers who are strictly nonsatiated
are almost exactly on their offer curves for any core allocation of a large enough
economy. Theorem 1 says the same for consumers who are asymptotically satiated.
Thus, if both types are in a single economy, then almost all consumers of both types
are almost exactly on their offer curves for every core allocation of a large enough
economy. Therefore, the core converges.
Or arbitrarily close to the supremum is the utility function is bounded above.
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4. Conclusion
Muench showed that core of a pubhc goods continuum economy is not neces-
sarily equivalent to the set of Lindahl allocations. The question of the generality
of this result was left open. This paper goes part way to giving an answer. Both
asymptotic satiation and strict nonsatiation are shown to be sufficient to guaran-
tee core convergence for a class of convex and monotone public goods economies.
Asymptotic satiation has a natural economic interpretation. Moreover, preferences
for many, though probably not all, types are public goods are likely to satisfy this
assumption. Strict nonsatiation is less appealing economically but serves to point
out the differences between the conditions required for convergence in public and
private goods economies.
The two convergence conditions discussed in this paper seem to describe ex-
treme situations. Asymptotic satiation implies that the offer correspondences con-
verge to the endowment, and that in the limit, only a negligible part of each con-
sumer's endowment of the private good is devoted to public goods production at
any core allocation. Strict nonsatiation, on the other hand, implies that the offer
curves converge to zero, and that essentially all of the private goods are devoted
to public goods production at any core allocation. This provides support for the
feeling among public goods economists that the core is generally larger than the
Lindahl equilibria. In a related paper, we study a much more restricted model (a
one public good, one private good, transferable utility economy) and show that
under certain conditions, asymptotic satiation is necessary and sufficient for core
convergence. We also show that under slightly more general conditions, generically
the core does not converge to the set of Lindahl allocations.
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